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1. INTRODUCTION 
The obligation to pay hire in time charterparties is one of the most important charterers’ obligations 
vis-à-vis the ship-owners. Hire functions as remuneration for ship-owners’ services under time 
charterparty and covers ship-owners’ expenses which they incur in relation to the services they 
provide. Charterers’ default in payment of hire may therefore cause problems in ship-owners’ everyday 
financial operations and expose them to serious liquidity problems.  
 
The importance of both charterers’ obligation to pay hire and corresponding ship-owners’ right to 
timeous hire payment explains the significance of remedies for charterers’ payment default. The ship-
owners need protection of their right to timeous hire payment, whereas the charterers need certainty in 
their legal position in case they are found to be in payment default. Thus, the available remedies are 
important for both the ship-owners and the charterers. 
 
The system of available remedies for charterers’ default in payment of hire in time charterparties under 
English law is dual. There are legal remedies available at common law and contractual remedies 
available according to certain contractual terms. 
 
Legal literature suggests that legal remedies for defaults in payment of hire under English law are 
surprisingly uncertain and on occasions may also be considered by the shipping industry as 
inadequate
1
. 
 
Uncertainty in available legal remedies for defaults in payment of hire under English law stems, at least 
partially, from controversial construction of the contractual obligation to pay hire. Both legal literature
2
 
and practitioners
3
 – until the recent decision in The Astra case – were more likely to say that the 
obligation to pay hire under English law is characterized as an intermediate (or innominate) term or 
                                                          
1
 Thomas, §7.7. 
2
 Time Charters, §16.132: “(…) the better view is that obligation to pay hire is by nature an intermediate term 
(…)”; Thomas, §7.69: “(…) parties are resigned to its status [status of obligation to pay hire] as a warranty (…)”. 
3
 Reed Smith report Is payment of hire a condition? A long standing controversy resolved 
http://www.reedsmith.com/Is-payment-of-hire-a-condition-a-long-standing-controversy-resolved-04-18-2013/;  
INCE&CO report The Astra: Single Hire Default Entitles Owners to Withdraw and Claim Loss of Profit for 
Remaining Charter Period http://incelaw.com/documents/pdf/strands/shipping/article/the-astra;  
Steamship Mutual report Non-payment of Hire – Right to Withdraw 
http://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/Astra0613.htm. 
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even a warranty rather than a condition. The position that the obligation to pay hire is an intermediate 
term, however, due to the absence of clear judicial authority was uncertain and there were indeed 
suggestions to the contrary
4
.  
 
Intermediate term implies that the innocent party’s right to terminate a contract at common law and to 
claim damages for loss of bargain (i.e. losses which accrue as a result of a premature determination of a 
contract) arises only in case of a serious breach, which deprives the innocent party not in default of 
substantially the whole benefit of the contract (as opposed to conditions, any breach of which entitles 
the innocent party to the same). In the context of the obligation to pay hire, this means that in order for 
the ship-owners to be entitled to the above-mentioned remedies the ship-owners must assess the gravity 
of charterers’ default in payment of hire (i.e. whether it constitutes charterers’ repudiatory breach5 or 
not). This is, however, not an easy assessment to make, since situations of charterers’ payment defaults 
are highly fact dependent and two missed hire payments may suffice in one case, but not necessarily in 
another. Furthermore, the ship-owners must exercise their right to terminate at common law at the right 
time. Too early as well as too late exercise may lead to the ship-owners themselves being in 
repudiatory breach. The subtlety of ship-owners’ slippery election between acceptance of charterers’ 
repudiatory breach with subsequent termination of time charterparty and affirmation of time 
charterparty is reflected in a recent Fortune Plum case. 
 
Legal literature suggests that the uncertainty and limitations of legal remedies for charterers’ payment 
default contributed, at least in part, to the emergence of contractual remedies
6
. It is indeed common 
practice to have an express right of withdrawal for charterers’ payment default drafted into standard 
time charterparties
7
. The withdrawal clause by its very nature grants an express termination right for 
the ship-owners and entitles them to withdraw the vessel upon non-payment of hire irrespective of any 
further factual circumstances, provided the procedure stipulated in the contract is strictly complied 
                                                          
4
 Comments that the obligation to pay hire is a condition are found in Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, 
Termination and Remedies, §11-014; McMeel, §23.10. 
5
 For the sake of clarity it is submitted that in the thesis (i) any breach of a condition; (ii) serious breach of an 
intermediate term, which deprives the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of the contract, and (iii) 
evincing an inability (incapacity) to perform or intention not to perform or to perform inconsistently with the 
contract are referred as “repudiatory breach”. 
6
 Thomas, §7.11.  
7
 Cf. New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) 1946 form clause 5, “Shelltime 4” issued December 1984 amended 
2003 lines 196–199, Baltime form 1939 as revised 2001 lines 86–92. 
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with
8
. Simultaneously, the ship-owners are entitled to claim unpaid hire due as at the date of 
withdrawal. 
 
It is submitted that in a rising market the withdrawal clause is indeed capable to eliminate ship-owners’ 
difficulties associated with the construction of the obligation to pay hire as an intermediate term, 
because it provides the ship-owners with a tool to get the vessel back by terminating the charterparty 
upon non-payment of hire and because the question of damages for loss of bargain in a rising market 
simply does not arise (as the withdrawn vessel is normally subsequently employed at a more profitable 
hire rates).  
 
But this is not the same when the market is falling. In a falling market, the withdrawal clause only 
grants the express termination right for the ship-owners and in the absence of charterers’ repudiatory 
breach damages for loss of bargain are not available. Since the damages for loss of bargain in such 
situation equals to the difference between the charterparty hire rate and the hire rate of a subsequent 
charterparty, which in a falling market would normally be substantially lower (or there may be no 
substitute charterparty at all due to the hardship in the market), the availability of damages for loss of 
bargain is important, but, however, dependent on charterers being in repudiatory breach.  
 
Given the fact that nowadays standard time charterparties normally include withdrawal clauses
9
 it is 
namely on the point of damages for loss of bargain the discussion whether the obligation to pay hire is 
an intermediate term or a condition is legally and commercially significant.   
 
Relatively recent case law – the Commercial Court’s judge Flaux J’s judgment in The Astra – purports 
to provide an answer and to eliminate the uncertainty related to the construction of the obligation to 
pay hire by labeling the obligation to pay hire punctually in clause 5 of the NYPE as a condition.  
 
Since the NYPE form, which is commonly used by the market, has wider application to other 
charterparty forms that contain similar hire payment clauses, it is submitted that Flaux J’s decision 
concerns not only those time charterparties, which are/will be concluded on the NYPE, but also those 
on other standard time charterparty forms. For this reason Flaux J’s decision in The Astra case is not 
only one of the most discussed recent decisions among those working in shipping, but it has been 
                                                          
8
 Notably, the withdrawal clause may be drafted as giving the right to withdraw the vessel only after expiry of a 
certain grace period. 
9
 Cf. supra note 7. 
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appraised as “one of the most controversial”10 and “potentially ground-breaking”11 judgments in recent 
years. 
 
This thesis thus has two major objectives: 
(1) to analyze the legal grounds on which it was found in The Astra that the obligation to pay hire in 
clause 5 of the NYPE is a condition, and 
(2) to analyze the legal and commercial effects of The Astra.  
 
The thesis consists of four parts. In the first part the short introduction into the research question and 
the aim of the research was presented. The following two parts are devoted for the above listed 
objectives of the thesis. The first of the two parts comprises of three main sections. In the first one (2.1) 
the nature of time charterparties as well as brief characteristics of the obligation to pay hire are 
presented. It is noted that this section aims to present only those aspects of both time charterparties and 
the obligation to pay hire which are important for the purposes of the thesis and thus is limited in its 
scope. In the second section (2.2) the classification of contractual terms is analyzed with the particular 
focus on conditions. In addition, the construction of the obligation to pay hire in time charterparties as 
a contractual term prior to The Astra is presented, including presentation of the general legal position 
in situations of charterers’ default in payment of hire. The third section (2.3) is devoted for The Astra 
case and the analysis of the legal grounds on which it is based. The third part aims to fulfill the tasks of 
the second objective and to present analysis of the legal effects and commercial implications of The 
Astra. The last part summarizes the findings and presents concluding remarks on the research question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Shirley, §56. 
11
 Butler, Kouzoupis.  
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2. THE OBLIGATION TO PAY HIRE IN TIME CHARTER PARTIES  
2.1. The nature of time charterparties and the obligation to pay hire  
The significance and characteristics of the obligation to pay hire are first and foremost determined by 
the nature of time charterparty.  
 
A time charterparty may be defined as a contract for a period or for a trip under which, in return for the 
payment of hire, the vessel’s employment is put under the orders of the charterers, while possession 
remains with the ship-owners who provide the crew and pay the ordinary running costs, 
characteristically excluding specific voyage costs such as fuel and cargo handling and port charges 
which are paid for by the charterers
12
. Although the exact allocation of costs and responsibilities 
between the ship-owners and the charterers is subject to time charterparty clauses, the distinctive 
feature of time charterparty is that it is a contract of services, according to which ship-owners, in 
exchange of charterers’ obligation to pay hire, undertake to make services of a ship and her crew, i.e. 
earning capacity of a ship, available to the charterers
13
. It follows from the definition of a time 
charterparty as a contract of services that no right of possession of a ship under time charterparty is 
transferred to the charterers
14
.  Namely on this point time charterparties are to be contrasted with 
demise charterparties which are contracts for the leasing of a ship under which the charterers take 
possession of the ship and also provide their own crew and ship management to operate her
15
. 
 
In functional terms, the charterers get the right to manage the vessel in terms of commercial 
employment, i.e. the charterers get the right to give orders as to cargoes to be loaded and voyages to be 
undertaken, and undertake to pay the agreed rate of hire, whereas the ship-owners undertake to perform 
services in accordance with charterers’ orders, provided they are given in conformity with time 
charterparty. In legal terms, however, it is an exchange of promises that takes place – ship-owners’ 
promise to put services of a ship and her crew at charterers’ disposal is given in exchange of charterers’ 
                                                          
12
 Voyage Charters, §1.1.  
13
 The Scaptrade at 256 per Lord Diplock; The Laconia at 319 per Lord Wilberforce. 
14
 The Tankexpress at 50 per Lord Porter. 
15
 Time Charters, §I.6. 
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promise to pay hire. In this respect, hire operates as consideration given by the charterers to the ship-
owners for the services of a ship and her crew made available
16
. 
 
It follows from the allocation of functions between the ship-owners and the charterers in a time 
charterparty that it is the charterers who bear all the risks associated with the commercial operation of 
the ship, which means that the charterers enjoy the full benefit of the earnings of the vessel or, 
conversely, they bear all the detriment if trading of the vessel turns out to be unprofitable due to 
adverse market conditions. For this reason hire as remuneration for ship-owners’ services in time 
charterparty is typically calculated per time unit (per day, semi-monthly, per month etc.), regardless of 
actual earnings of the vessel, and is paid in advance
17
. In this way ship-owners by virtue of hire payable 
periodically under time charterparty avoid the commercial risks associated with trading of the vessel 
and receive the benefit of regular and defined cash flow
18
, whereas the charterers by way of payment of 
hire get the right to exploit the vessel as a revenue-generating chattel
19
.  
 
Thus, from an economic perspective, payment of hire functions as remuneration for ship-owners’ 
services under a time charterparty and covers ship-owners’ expenses in relation to the services they 
provide
20
. In this respect charterers’ obligation to pay hire plays an important role in terms of ship-
owners’ liquidity and their ability to perform contractual services21. However, there is no firm and 
definite answer in the authorities as to whether charterers’ payment of hire and ship-owners’ services 
are interdependent so that the former is a condition precedent to the latter
22
. 
 
                                                          
16
 The Tankexpress at 53 per Lord Wright. 
17
 Cf. NYPE 1946 clause 5, “Shelltime 4” issued December 1984 amended December 2003 line 185, Baltime 
1939 as revised 2001 lines 80–92. 
18
Time Charters, §I.45.  
19
 Ibid., §I.39. 
20
 The ship-owners typically bear fixed costs, associated with the services they provide, which normally do not 
depend on the voyages being performed by the vessel or ports being called at (e.g. insurance, ship maintenance 
costs, provisions, crew wages, stores et al.), cf. NYPE 1946 clause 1, “Shelltime 4” issued December 1984 
amended December 2003 lines 148–159, Baltime 1939 as revised 2001 lines 37–47. However, hire may also be 
used to cover other ship-owners’ expenses, such as interest and principal on ship-owners’ mortgage loan, cf. 
Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian Perspective, p.435. 
21
 The Scaptrade at 257-258 per Lord Diplock. 
22
 This issue will be addressed later in the thesis, cf. sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.3.5.2. 
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From a legal perspective, however, hire is to be paid irrespective of both actual services being provided 
(actual use of the ship by the charterers) and actual expenses being incurred by the ship-owners
23
. This 
is explained by the very nature of time charterparty, the allocation of risks between the ship-owners 
and the charterers in time charterparty
24
 and the fact that hire in time charterparties is earned upon 
services of a ship and her crew being made available to the charterers
25
. This also means that unless 
certain exceptions apply, hire is to be paid for the whole contractual period between delivery and 
redelivery of the ship
26
. In this respect the obligation to pay hire is often characterized as continuous 
and unconditional
27
. 
 
Another important legal characteristic of the obligation to pay hire is that it is an absolute obligation. It 
means that in case hire is not paid when due, the charterers are in default of payment of hire, i.e. in 
breach of time charterparty, irrespective of fault
28
 (unless qualifications of the obligation are provided 
in time charterparties which is not the case with standard charterparty forms).  
 
Given the characteristics above it follows that charterers’ obligation to pay hire is one of the most basic 
charterers’ obligations in time charterparties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Actual expenses may be of interest in time charterparties containing the so-called “escalation clauses”. 
24
 The Gregos at 4 per Lord Mustill. 
25
 The Aquafaith at 68 per Cooke J. 
26
 Time Charters, §I.45; Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, §16-009.  
27
 Thomas, §7.5; Time Charters, §I.45. 
28
 Thomas, §7.4; Time Charters, §16.73. 
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2.2. Classification of the obligation to pay hire as a contractual term 
2.2.1. Classification of contractual terms: conditions, warranties, intermediate terms 
2.2.1.1. General on classification of contractual terms 
Historically, contractual terms under English law were classified as conditions and warranties, the 
dichotomy of which is referred to as orthodox
29
. In the 1960’s after the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Hongkong Fir case, however, it was recognized that there is a third category of intermediate (or 
innominate) terms
30
. It is generally accepted therefore that contractual terms under English law 
currently fall into three main categories – conditions, warranties and intermediate terms31.  
 
“Condition” as a term has many meanings and is used in a variety of senses32. However, when a term 
“condition” is used to refer to a contractual undertaking , it means a contractual duty, a breach of which 
entitles the innocent party, if he so chooses, to treat himself as discharged from further performance 
under the contract, and to claim damages for loss sustained by the breach
33
. Conversely, a “warranty”34 
                                                          
29
 Legal literature suggests that conditions and warranties have evolved from the rules of pleading rather than 
substantive law, namely, from the distinction of dependent and independent promises, terminology of which was 
employed by the courts since 16
th
 century. It was towards the end of the 19
th
 century when terms “dependent” and 
“independent” were often replaced by the terms “condition” and “warranty” (cf. Carter, Hodgekiss, p.31–42). 
30
 Legal literature suggests that although the third category of intermediate terms is often seen as the modern 
doctrine, it has older roots (Anson’s Law of Contract, p.140). Treitel refers to intermediate terms as to “the 
invention or perhaps more accurately [as] the rediscovery of a third type of contract term” (Treitel (2002), p.113). 
However, it does not depreciate the significance of Diplock LJ’s judgment in Hongkong Fir, which is claimed to 
be the most important judicial contribution to English contract law in the 20
th
 century (Ibid.). 
31
 Legal literature is not entirely uniform concerning the question of how many categories of contractual terms 
there are under English law. Some scholars enlist “fundamental term” as fourth category (cf. Treitel (2002), p. 
127–138); some suggest that the better way of classification is the dichotomy of conditions and non-conditions 
(cf. Poole, p.302). However, majority of authorities support the threefold division of conditions, warranties and 
intermediate terms (e.g. Chitty on Contracts, §§12-019–12-024; Treitel on The Law of Contract, §18-048; 
Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and Remedies, §10-001). 
32
 Chitty on Contracts, §§12-025–12-030; McMeel, §§20.01–20.07. 
33
 Chitty on Contracts, §12-019; Atiyah’s Introduction to The Law of Contract, p.193–194. 
34
 As in case of conditions, “warranty” as a term may also be used in a variety of senses (cf. Chitty on Contracts, 
§12-031–12-033, McMeel, §§20.26–20.32). 
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is a contractual undertaking, a breach of which does not entitle the innocent party to treat himself as 
discharged, but to claim damages only
35
.  
 
An intermediate term is neither a condition, nor a warranty. A breach of an intermediate term may 
entitle the innocent party to treat himself as discharged, but this will depend on the nature and 
consequences of the breach
36
. As Lord Diplock stated in Hongkong Fir case: 
 
“There are, however, many contractual undertakings of a more complex character which cannot be 
categorized as being “conditions” or “warranties”….Of such undertakings all that can be predicated is 
that some breaches will and others will not give rise to an event which will deprive the party not in 
default of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from the contract; 
and the legal consequences of a breach of such an undertaking, unless provided for expressly in the 
contract, depend upon the nature of the event to which the breach gives rise and do not follow 
automatically from a prior classification of the undertaking as a “condition” or “warranty”. 
 
It follows that a breach of an intermediate term which deprives the innocent party from substantially 
the whole benefit of the contract entitles the innocent party to treat himself as discharged, whereas any 
other less serious breach sounds in damages only. 
 
It may be summarized thus that contractual terms are classified into conditions, warranties and 
intermediate terms by way of available remedies at common law upon the breach of each contractual 
term. It is namely the availability of the remedy of the right to terminate the contract, which 
distinguishes the types of contractual terms.  
 
As regards damages, successful termination at common law entitles the innocent party to claim 
damages for loss of bargain (damages for future loss, which accrue as a result of premature 
determination of a contract, or post-termination damages)
37
, which are not possible to claim when there 
is no successful termination at common law merely for the reason that there is no future loss as the 
contract is not terminated and thus stands. For the sake of clarity and consistency, however, it should 
                                                          
35
 Chitty on Contracts, §12-019. Notably, certain exceptions exist and a breach of warranty may entitle the 
innocent party to terminate the contract, but this is true only in certain contexts where warranty has its specific 
“archaic” usage, e.g. in insurance (cf. Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and Remedies, 
§10-007). 
36
 Ibid., §12-020. 
37
 McMeel, §20.10, §23.31. 
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be noted that the legal basis of damages for loss of bargain is not the act of termination, but the breach 
itself which is treated in law as repudiatory
38
.  
 
Thus, from the common law position, the legal consequences of any breach of a condition and a serious 
breach of an intermediate term which deprives the innocent party from substantially the whole benefit 
of the contract, are the same – the innocent party may treat the contract as repudiated39, i.e. the 
innocent party may, at his election, exercise the common law right to terminate the contract and claim 
damages for loss of bargain. Likewise, the legal consequences of any breach of a warranty and a breach 
of an intermediate term which does not deprive the innocent party from substantially the whole benefit 
of the contract are the same in the sense that the innocent party is not entitled to terminate the contract 
at common law and will claim damages assessed in the normal way, i.e. the amounts required so far as 
possible to put the innocent party back to the position he would have been in but for the breach. 
 
The difference in the available remedies upon breach of contractual terms and especially the 
uncertainty of determining a repudiatory breach of an intermediate term manifests the significance of 
classification of contractual terms into particular categories. 
 
2.2.1.2. The two-stage classification test  
Prior to Hongkong Fir decision the test for distinguishing conditions and warranties was one of 
construction (the term-analysis test). With Hongkong Fir decision a test which requires analysis of the 
breach was introduced (the breach-analysis test). The two different tests which brought some confusion 
to the law of contractual terms were reconciled in Bunge v. Tradax decided by House of Lords and it is 
now settled that in order to construe a condition it is not necessary to show that every breach of a 
particular term deprives the innocent party from a substantially whole benefit of the contract
40
. 
 
                                                          
38
 Peel, p.523. It is suggested that if the legal basis of loss of bargain damages were the act of termination, the 
loss of bargain damages would be also available for the act of termination pursuant to the express termination 
clause in a contract, which is not the case. 
39
 McMeel, §§20.08–20.11. 
40
 Cf. Carter, Hodgekiss, p.31–32, 50; McMeel, §20.14. 
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It is suggested thus that unless a particular contractual term falls into statutory or judicial classification 
the test of classification of a particular contractual term is two-stage: the one of construction and the 
one of the effect of breach
41
. As Lord Scarman put it in Bunge v. Tradax case
42
: 
“The first question is always, therefore, weather, upon true construction of a stipulation and the 
contract of which it is part, it is a condition, an innominate term, or only a warranty. If the stipulation is 
one, which upon the true construction of the contract the parties have not made a condition, and breach 
of which may be attended by trivial, minor, or very grave consequences, it is innominate…. Unless the 
contract makes it clear, either by express provision or by necessary implication arising from its nature, 
purpose, and circumstances…, that a particular term is a condition or only a warranty, it is an 
innominate term, the remedy for a breach of which depends upon the nature, consequences, and effect 
of the breach”. 
 
Legal literature suggests that in practice, since it is very rare for a term to be classified by courts as a 
warranty, the aforementioned two-stage test is a contest between conditions and intermediate terms
43
. It 
is submitted therefore that the practical application of the test is as follows: first, the question whether 
upon the true construction of the contract a particular contractual term is a condition must be 
examined; second, if the answer to the first question is negative, the term is an intermediate term, and 
at this point the analysis of the effect of the breach is to be employed in order to determine the 
applicable remedy. Since the latter stage of the test deals with the effect of the breach, which is 
employed for the purpose of determination of applicable remedy, the essential question to be answered 
is such: when is a contractual term a condition?  
 
2.2.1.3. When is a contractual term a condition? 
It is stipulated in Chitty on Contracts that a contractual term generally will be held to be a condition
44
:  
(i) if it is expressly so provided by statute; 
(ii) if it has been so categorized as the result of previous judicial decision; 
(iii) if it is so designated in the contract or if the consequences of its breach, that is, the right of the 
innocent party to treat himself as discharged, are provided for expressly in the contract; or 
                                                          
41
 McMeel, §20.13. 
42
 Bunge v. Tradax at 7. 
43
 McMeel, §20.14. 
44
 Chitty on Contracts, §12-040. The Chitty’s list of instances when a contractual term will be held to be a 
condition is not only used by other scholars (e.g. Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and 
Remedies, §§10-009–10-010; Anson’s Law of Contract, p.146–149), but was also approved by the Court of 
Appeal in The Seaflower. 
14 
 
(iv) if the nature of the contract or the subject-matter or the circumstances of the case lead to the 
conclusion that the parties must, by necessary implication, have intended that the innocent 
party would be discharged from further performance of his obligations in the event that the 
term was not fully and precisely complied with. 
 
It may be added that a contractual term will be held to be a condition if it is a stipulation as to time of 
performance and if such stipulation is of the essence of the contract
45
. As a matter of fact, time 
stipulations as an instance of a condition fall either under (iii) or (iv) in the aforementioned Chitty’s 
list, because the stipulations as to time may be construed as being of the essence either if it is expressly 
stated as such by the parties, or if the court infers from the nature of the subject-matter of the contract 
or surrounding circumstances that the parties intended them to have that effect
46
. Nevertheless, it is 
suggested that stipulations as to time has its own history and terminology which justifies, although 
perhaps not very satisfactorily, a separate discussion
47
. Indeed, time stipulations are often discussed as 
a separate ground for classification of a contractual term as a condition by the courts, as happened also 
in The Astra. Thus, for the purposes of the thesis, time stipulations are indicated as a separate case of 
when a term might be found to be a condition, provided such stipulation is of the essence of the 
contract. 
 
Taking into account the above-mentioned Chitty’s list and since the cases of (i) statutory and (ii) 
judicial classification of terms are relatively simple, it is submitted that the cases belonging to (iii) and 
(iv) of the Chitty’s list deserve further elaboration.  
 
With regard to (iii) it must be noted that generally usage of the phrase “of the essence” in a contract 
will be considered as an indicator that a term is a condition, whereas usage of the word “condition” 
might not suffice
48
. It is also noted that the express provision of the innocent party’s right to treat 
himself as discharged, taken in isolation and by its own, does not necessarily give the effect of the 
clause, upon breach of which such right is granted, being a condition
49
. 
 
                                                          
45
 Chitty on Contracts, §12-039. 
46
 Ibid., §12-037. 
47
 Treitel on The Law of Contract, §18-089. 
48
 McMeel, §20.19. 
49
 This issue is an important one in terms of this thesis and is addressed later in the thesis, cf. section 2.3.5.1. 
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Classification (iv) involves the question of how to apply the first limb of a two-stage test
50
 which is the 
so-called term-analysis test. It is suggested
51
 that the explanation given by Lord Kerr in The Golodetz 
case
52
 in orthodox language is instructive when he, citing Fletcher Moulton J in Wallace v. Pratt case, 
stated that conditions are terms 
“...which go so directly to the substance of the contract or, in other words, are so essential to its very 
nature that their non-performance may fairly be considered by the other party as a substantial failure to 
perform the contract at all”, 
 
and continued that in situations where the commercial necessity for the characterization of a 
contractual term as a condition is not self-evident 
“…the issue whether or not a particular term of a contract is to be characterized as a condition must 
inevitably involve a value judgment about the commercial significance of the term in question...”53. 
 
Notably, Lord Kerr’s approach in The Golodetz was accepted by the House of Lords in The Naxos54. 
 
Thus, it is the evaluation of the significance of a particular contractual term in a given commercial 
setting and “general scheme and tenor of the contract”55 which serves as a test for the identification of a 
contractual term as a condition. This approach does reflect the position under English law as it is in 
line with dicta in the House of Lords in Bunge v. Tradax and in The Gregos. In the former the 
construction of a contractual term in the light of the surrounding circumstances
56
 as well as the 
importance of considering the factual matrix – the nature, purpose and circumstances of the contract57 – 
was emphasized, whereas in the latter the evaluation of the practical importance of a particular 
contractual term in question in the scheme of the contract was highlighted
58
. 
 
                                                          
50
 Cf. section 2.2.1.2. 
51
 Treitel (1990), p.188. 
52
 The Golodetz at 282–283. 
53
 It is noted that Lord Kerr uses term “characterization”. Indeed, once commercial background is taken into 
account for considering whether or not a term is a condition, the exercise is one of characterization, rather than 
pure construction (interpretation), cf. McMeel, §20.25.  
54
 The Naxos at 36 per Lord Ackner. 
55
 Ibid. at 31 per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. 
56
 Bunge v. Tradax at 8 per Lord Lowry. 
57
 Bunge v. Tradax at 7 per Lord Scarman. 
58
 The Gregos at 9 per Lord Mustill. 
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Admittedly, Lord Kerr in The Golodetz held that, if a contractual term is a condition precedent to the 
performance of other terms by the other party, the commercial necessity for such contractual term to be 
characterized as a condition is self-evident
59
. However, it is not always the case and the last argument 
against or in favour for construction of a particular contractual term as a condition is found in the 
arsenal of policy considerations
60
. 
  
2.2.1.4. Why is a term construed as a condition? 
The underlying policy consideration for contractual terms to be classified as conditions is certainty (as 
parties to a contract know exactly where they stand and what the results of even a trivial breach of a 
particular term would be).
61
 However, there are situations when certainty is traded for flexibility and 
promotion of interests of justice – these are the underlying policy considerations of intermediate 
terms
62
. Intermediate terms restrict the innocent party’s right to terminate a contract for breaches which 
do not deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of the contract, and thus prevent the 
innocent party from terminating for uterior motives, such as escaping from a bargain which turned out 
to be unprofitable or snatching the more profitable opportunity
63
. As Lord Roskill put it in The Hansa 
Nord 
“…contracts are made to be performed and not to be avoided according to the whims of market 
fluctuations and where there is a free choice between two possible constructions I think the Court 
should tend to prefer that construction which will ensure performance…”64.  
 
However, certainty is still of considerable importance. The famous statement of Lord Bridge in The 
Chikuma reads as follows: 
“The ideal at which the courts should aim, in construing such clauses [withdrawal of a vessel clauses], 
is to produce a result that in any given situation both parties seeking legal advice…can expect the same 
                                                          
59
 More on the effect of conditions precedent see section 2.3.5.2. 
60
 Treitel (1990), p.189. 
61
 Chitty on Contracts, §12-034, Treitel on the Law of Contract, §18-050. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Treitel on the Law of Contract, §18-050. 
64
 The Hansa Nord at 457 per Lord Roskill. The policy argument was accepted also in The Gregos at 9 per Lord 
Mustill. 
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clear and confident answer from their advisers and neither will be tempted to embark on long and 
expensive litigation in the belief that victory depends on winning the sympathy of the court”65. 
 
Generally, it may be said that the contest between conditions and intermediate terms is a contest 
between certainty and predictability on the one side, and flexibility and interests of justice on the other. 
Nevertheless, this does not imply that courts classify contractual terms on the grounds of whichever 
underlying values they consider to be just in a particular case – the policy considerations are not per se 
a ground for classification. As famously put by Lord Wilberforce in Bunge v. Tradax: 
“…the Courts should not be reluctant, if the intentions of the parties as shown by the contract so 
indicate, to hold that an obligation has the force of condition…”66 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, it is ultimately the parties’ intentions that are decisive. 
 
2.2.2. Construction of the obligation to pay hire prior to The Astra 
As indicated in the Introduction, the obligation to pay hire prior to The Astra was generally seen as not 
a condition of a contract. This general understanding, however, had no firm judicial authority. Very 
few cases had indeed touched upon a question whether the obligation to pay hire in clause 5 of the 
NYPE or any other standard charterparty was a condition or not as well as whether default in payment 
of hire leading to withdrawal of a vessel entitled the ship-owners to claim damages for loss of bargain.  
 
One of the main authorities supporting the construction that the obligation to pay hire is not a 
condition, is the [then] Admiralty Court’s decision in The Brimnes rendered by Brandon J. The 
Brimnes case concerned the withdrawal of a vessel upon the exercise of a ship-owners’ right in clause 
5 of the NYPE (dated 22 November 1968) as a result of the charterers late payment of hire which was 
due on 1 April, 1970. The vessel was withdrawn on 2 April, 1970, being the same day as charterers’ 
belated payment of hire was made. It should be noted that almost over the whole period of the 
                                                          
65
 The Chikuma at 377. For the sake of consistency, it is noted that this part of Lord’s Bridge speech has not gone 
unchallenged as Lord Denning has expressed critical views about it in his last book The Closing Chapter in 
support to Dr. F. A. Mann’s critical comments about the same in his article Uncertain Certainty (cf. Reynolds, 
p.189). 
66
 Bunge v. Tradax at 6. 
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charterparty (from December, 1968, until April, 1970) the charterers were invariably late in paying hire 
and the ship-owners complained about that as from January, 1970
67
.  
 
Brandon J. decided that the ship-owners were entitled pursuant to clause 5 of the NYPE to withdraw 
the ship on the ground of charterers’ failure to pay hire punctually. However, Brandon J. also decided 
that the ship-owners were not entitled to withdraw the ship on the ground of breach of an essential term 
(i.e. a condition of a contract) or of repudiation. Brandon J said in the judgment that “there is nothing 
in the clause 5 [of the NYPE] which shows clearly that the parties intended the obligation to pay hire 
punctually to be an essential term of a contract, as distinct from being a term, for breach of which an 
express right to withdraw was given”68. However, the latter part of the judgment is considered to be 
obiter since the Brandon J’s finding that the withdrawal pursuant to clause 5 was lawful was upheld by 
the Court of Appeal and, notably, the Court of Appeal did not address the condition point directly.  
 
Another case to be mentioned in support of Brandon J’s findings in The Brimnes, is The Kos in which 
Andrew Smith J’s made an obiter statement that “the general view is…that the failure to pay hire when 
it is due is a breach of an intermediate term, and not necessarily repudiatory”69. 
 
At the same time however, there were other, albeit obiter, pronouncements by the courts to the 
contrary
70
, as a result of which, it is suggested, the classification of the obligation to pay hire has 
always been subject to conflicting opinions
71
. It seems that the uncertainty surrounding the authorities 
has influenced the market players, their legal advisers and even scholars to opt for the relatively “safer” 
construction of the obligation to pay hire as an intermediate term
72
.  
                                                          
67
 The Brimnes also concerned an extensive discussion, since there was uncertainty as to the facts, whether the 
notice of withdrawal preceded belated payment of hire or not – in the light of The Georgios C this was an 
important issue to be considered and will be, however, addressed later in the thesis, cf. section 2.3.5.4. 
68
 The Brimnes at 482. 
69
 The Kos at 95. 
70
 E.g. the dicta of the House of Lords in The Tankexpress, The Laconia, The Mihalios Xilas, United Scientifics 
Holdings, The Afovos, which will be addressed in section 2.3.5.2. 
71
 Carter (2012), p.290. 
72
 Cf. supra notes 2,3. The preferred construction is referred to as “safer”, since, given the uncertainties in judicial 
authorities and if the obligation to pay hire would not be held to be a condition, non-repudiatory charterers’ 
breach of the obligation to pay hire would not suffice for the ship-owners to get loss of bargain damages. Thus, in 
order to get damages the ship-owners would need to wait until it would be “safe” to claim charterers being in 
repudiatory breach. 
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It is submitted that due to uncertainty in the authorities, a substitution of one of the essential 
characteristics of a condition – the innocent party’s right to treat himself as discharged from further 
performance upon any breach with a subsequent right to terminate the contract at common law – has 
therefore as a rule been included in standard time charterparties by way of the express ship-owners’ 
right to withdraw the vessel upon charterers’ default of punctual payment of hire, i.e. by way of 
express termination provision (the so-called withdrawal clause)
73
. Given the fact that most of the 
withdrawal cases prior to The Astra were those in a rising market, where the withdrawn vessel was 
subsequently employed at a more profitable rate, – the question of another essential characteristic of a 
condition – the innocent party’s right to claim damages for loss of bargain – naturally did not arise74. It 
may be said thus that the cautiousness of the market by way of including express termination 
provisions in standard time charterparties combined with favourable market conditions are those 
reasons why the question whether the obligation to pay hire is a condition or not finds no firm answer 
in case law. 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the obligation to pay hire considered as an intermediate term implies 
that, provided as is the rule that a standard time charterparty contains a withdrawal clause (express 
termination provision), ship-owners’ right to claim damages for loss of bargain arises only when 
charterers’ default in payment of hire constitutes a repudiatory breach75. Thus, the generally accepted 
position prior to The Astra was that in order for the ship-owners to treat themselves as discharged from 
further performance (in case there was no withdrawal clause in a contract) and in any event (whether in 
the absence of the withdrawal clause or not) claim damages for loss of bargain it was necessary to 
show that the charterers were in repudiatory breach. 
 
It was suggested that damages for loss of bargain are not available solely upon exercise of an express 
termination provision
76
 (when there is no repudiatory breach), because the ship-owners by exercise of 
                                                          
73
 Cf. supra note 6. 
74
 Cf. an overview of withdrawal cases by Meng. 
75
 Cf. also section 2.2.1.1. 
76
 Here and later in the thesis the “express termination provision” or “express right to terminate” refers to express 
termination provision in a contract when express right to terminate is granted upon breach of a certain term of a 
contract (as opposed to other possible formulations of express termination provisions where express right to 
terminate may be granted upon occurrence of a certain event and not a breach of a contractual term). 
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an express right to withdraw the vessel “breaks the chain of causation”77 and the loss of bargain is not 
therefore “effectively caused”78 by charterers’ failure to pay hire on time. In this respect, it is stated 
that the party, exercising its express right to terminate, becomes “the author of his own misfortune”, 
because the party gives up voluntarily its right to insist on future performance and accordingly any 
substitutionary relief in lieu thereof
79
. In other words, the legal basis of damages for loss of bargain 
was namely a repudiatory breach, which entitles the innocent party to treat himself as discharged from 
further performance. In this case it was not the innocent party’s decision to terminate the contract, but 
the breach itself, which destroyed the bargain
80
. 
 
Demonstrating repudiatory breach, however, is not without difficulties. What kind of charterers’ 
default in payment of hire and when does it indeed constitute charterers’ repudiatory breach? – were 
the questions that the ship-owners and their legal advisers found not easy to answer. 
 
Case law demonstrates that what default constitutes charterers’ repudiatory breach and when is very 
much fact-dependent. In The Brimnes one missed hire payment, even in the context of relatively long 
history of multiple charterers’ defaults in payment of hire (almost constant late hire payment), did not 
suffice to find charterers in repudiatory breach. It seems that the court put weight on the fact that the 
ship-owners did not complain about the first 13 out of 14 payments being late and thus one hire 
payment being late did not amount to the evinced intention by the charterers not to be bound by the 
terms of the charterparty
81
. Similarly, in the Fortune Plum, the arbitration tribunal did not consider a 
pattern of persistent late hire payments (six hire payments being few days late and three hire payments 
being a week or more late) to be “seriously worrying”82, most probably because the ship-owners did 
not complain about hire payments being late. In The Afovos one missed half-monthly hire payment was 
                                                          
77
 The Kos at 95. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 McMeel, §23.31. 
80
 Peel, p.523. Alternatively to the causation theory, it is explained that damages for loss of bargain are not 
available upon mere exercise of express termination right because the party at the time of termination has not 
been discharged which is the necessary legal basis for damages of loss of bargain – cf. Carter (2012), p.291, 
where author states that the reasoning that the cause of the loss of the bargain is the promisee's decision to 
terminate “seems a commercially naive application of the causation concept”. 
81
 The Brimnes at 483. 
82
 Fortune Plum at 620. Notably, the tribunal’s approach was different with respect to subsequent hire payments, 
one of which was paid in three installments, the last of which was paid more than a month late. 
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held not to have the effect of depriving the ship-owners of substantially the whole benefit of the 
charterparty
83
 and thus charterers’ default was not repudiatory. In Leslie Shipping charterers’ 
repudiatory breach was found on the ground of two missed hire payments (the first non-payment of 
hire was by agreement covered by 2 bills of exchange, issued by the ship-owners, accepted by the 
charterers and then later dishonoured by them. In addition, the following hire payment was not paid)
84
. 
In Merlin case Greer J decided that “continuous non-payment” 85 of hire, which in fact consisted of 
three missed payments of hire, was a valid ground to award damages for loss of bargain.  
 
It followed from the case law that one missed hire payment rarely satisfied the repudiation test
86
 nor 
was it possible to guarantee that two missed payments would. It was more likely that charterers’ 
behavior and evinced intentions as well as ship-owners’ attitude and behavior in respect of the late 
payments of hire were weightier considerations than simply the number of missed hire payments. For 
this reason it was very often difficult to establish with certainty whether charterers were in repudiatory 
breach or not. 
 
Another difficulty in addition to determination whether the charterers were in repudiatory breach on 
particular facts, was the need for the ship-owners to exercise their right to terminate at common law at 
the right time. If termination of a contract (on the grounds of charterers’ repudiatory breach) was 
exercised too early – the ship-owners were at risk that the charterers would not be found to be in 
repudiatory breach, whereas if termination was too late – the ship-owners were at risk to be found to 
have affirmed the contract. Both situations would have lead to the ship-owners themselves being in 
repudiatory breach
87
. As indicated in the Introduction, the subtlety of timeous ship-owners’ election 
                                                          
83
 The Afovos per Lord Diplock at 341. 
84
 Although it is argued that Greer J’s language with respect to repudiation is not that clear, it is submitted that 
damages for loss of bargain were awarded in that case on the ground of charterers’ repudiatory breach. Greer J, 
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 Merlin at 186. 
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 Time Charters at §16.75. 
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 However, provided the termination of a charterparty was exercised pursuant to express withdrawal clause, 
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to be in repudiatory breach – would result in ship-owners being deprived of loss of bargain damages and not 
being in repudiatory breach. 
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between acceptance of charterers’ repudiatory breach with subsequent termination of time charterparty 
and affirmation of time charterparty is reflected in Fortune Plum case. In this case ship-owners 
terminated a time charterparty on the grounds that charterers were in repudiatory breach (on the basis 
of several missed hire payments and dishonoured promises to pay). However, the arbitration tribunal 
found the ship-owners having affirmed the charterparty by conduct and being in repudiatory breach 
themselves. It turned out that the ship-owners unreasonably delayed their decision to accept charterers’ 
repudiatory breach (the tribunal held that reasonable ship-owners were entitled to conclude that 
charterers were in repudiatory breach on 7 November 2011 and the reasonable time to decide whether 
to accept it as per facts expired on 11 November 2011 and thus termination on 14 November 2011 was 
late). The ship-owners’ appeal, however, succeeded on continued renunciation point (weather the ship-
owners were entitled to accept continuing charterers’ renunciation) in respect of which the case was 
remitted to the tribunal. 
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2.3. Construction of the obligation to pay hire in The Astra: the obligation to 
pay hire is a condition 
 
2.3.1. Introductory remarks 
As indicated in the Introduction, The Astra, a recent judgment rendered by the Commercial Court’s 
judge Flaux J, holding that the obligation to pay hire punctually under clause 5 of the NYPE (whether 
on its own or in conjunction with the anti-technicality clause) is a condition, induced a lot of discussion 
among legal practitioners and is largely seen as debatable. This section aims to analyze The Astra, 
namely the legal grounds on which the decision is based, and discuss if there is room for contrary 
conclusion that the obligation to pay hire under clause 5 of the NYPE is not a condition, but an 
intermediate term. Before the analysis, the background facts, the arbitrators’ decision and the legal 
grounds on which the Commercial Court’s judgment is based are presented. 
 
2.3.2. The background facts  
The vessel Astra was chartered on an amended NYPE 1946 form dated 6 October 2008 for a period of 
five years. Clause 5 of the NYPE required the charterers Kuwait Rocks Co to make punctual and 
regular payment of hire 30 days in advance, breach of which would give the ship-owners AMN 
Bulkcarriers Inc an option to withdraw the vessel and terminate the charterparty. The charterparty also 
contained an anti-technicality clause incorporated in clause 31 which required the ship-owners to give 
the charterers two banking days’ notice of a failure to make a hire payment before they could exercise 
their right to terminate.  
After the charterparty was concluded hire rates fell and the agreed hire rate (US$28,600 per day) was 
soon above market. The charterers therefore were unable to trade the vessel profitably and thus sought 
reductions in hire. Several times the charterers came up with various proposals of a reduction in the 
hire rate and threatened repeatedly that, if the ship-owners did not agree, they would declare 
bankruptcy. In July 2009 the ship-owners agreed to reduce the hire rate (the newly agreed rate being of 
US$21,500 per day) for one year and the parties concluded an addendum clause 4 of which (in the 
judgment referred to as the Compensation Clause) inter alia stipulated that  
24 
 
“[i]n the event of the termination or cancelation of the Charter by reason of any breach by or failure of 
the Charterers to perform their obligations, Charterers shall…pay the Owners compensation for future 
loss of earnings…”.   
 
The re-negotiated charterparty, however, did not put an end to charterers’ requests for further 
reductions in the hire rate and threats that, unless the hire rate was further reduced, the charterers would 
declare bankruptcy. In July 2010, upon expiry of the one year period of the reduced hire rate, the 
parties reached a compromise agreement, which the charterers failed to comply with by non-payment 
of hire. The ship-owners subsequently served an anti-technicality notice and on 3 August 2010 
withdrew the vessel, terminated the charterparty and claimed that the charterers were in repudiatory 
breach.  
 
Within one month the ship-owners mitigated their loss by fixing the vessel on a substitute charter (at 
the rate of US$17,500 per day) and, faced with a very substantial loss of hire, commenced arbitration 
proceedings against the charterers.  
 
2.3.3. The arbitrators’ decision 
In the arbitration proceedings the ship-owners claimed that they were entitled to recover damages for 
future loss of earnings for the remainder period of the charterparty on the basis that (i) the charterers 
were in breach of a condition in not paying hire and/or (ii) in repudiatory/renunciatory breach of the 
charterparty.  
 
As to (i), the arbitrators rejected ship-owners’ argument that the obligation under clause 5 of the NYPE 
to pay hire was a condition on the basis that, whilst their instinct as commercial arbitrators would be to 
treat the obligation to pay hire pursuant to clause 5 of the NYPE as a condition, they were not 
persuaded that was the current state of English law
88
.  
 
As to (ii), the arbitrators upheld ship-owners’ argument that the charterers were in 
repudiatory/renunciatory breach on the basis that the totality of the evidence (namely, the repeated 
threats by the charterers that they would declare bankruptcy compounded by a failure to comply with 
the compromise agreement reached in July 2010) could only be interpreted as an intention by the 
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 The Astra at 73(§14). 
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charterers to perform at the very least the forthcoming part of the charterparty in a manner that was not 
consistent with it
89
. 
 
The charterers appealed on two questions of law contending that the arbitrators erred in law (i) by 
applying the wrong test for repudiation/renunciation and (ii) by failing to find that the Compensation 
Clause was a penalty clause. The ship-owners in their respondents’ notice also challenged the 
arbitrators’ finding that (iii) the obligation to pay hire under clause 5 of the NYPE was not a condition.  
 
2.3.4. The Commercial Court’s decision: the obligation to pay hire is a condition  
Flaux J in his judgment dismissed charterers’ appeal on both grounds, although noted that the second 
question whether the Compensation Clause was a penalty clause is academic, because having 
dismissed the appeal on the repudiation/renunciation point, the ship-owners were entitled to recover 
damages for loss of bargain pursuant to normal principles of the law of contract
90
. 
As to the issue raised by the ship-owners that the arbitrators erred in law when they found that the 
obligation to pay hire under clause 5 of the NYPE was not a condition, Flaux J found in favour of the 
ship-owners and concluded that clause 5 of the NYPE is a condition (whether on its own or in 
conjunction with the anti-technicality clause). This conclusion was supported by extensive and detailed 
review of the authorities which nearly over the last 100 years touched upon the question whether the 
obligation to pay hire is a condition and was based on the following four essential reasons: 
 
(i) clause 5 of the NYPE provides a right to withdraw the vessel whenever there is a failure to 
make punctual payment of hire, i.e. the right of withdrawal pursuant to clause 5 exists 
irrespective of the gravity of the breach of the obligation to pay hire, and “this is a strong 
indication that it was intended that failure to pay hire promptly would go to the root of the 
contract and thus that the provision was a condition”91; 
 
(ii) the general rule in commercial contracts is that time stipulations are considered of the essence 
and thus conditions – according to the obiter dicta statements of the House of Lords, except for 
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 Ibid. at 75(§19). 
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 Ibid. at 77(§29). 
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 Ibid. at 95(§109). 
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The Brimnes case, which was not followed, the obligation to pay hire punctually is a provision 
where time is of the essence
92
; 
 
(iii) the importance to businessmen of certainty in commercial transactions93; 
 
(iv) obiter statements in Stocznia v. Latco and Stocznia v Gearbulk supported the conclusion that 
the obligation to pay hire is a condition. 
 
Alternatively, Flaux J held that even if his conclusion that the obligation to pay hire punctually under 
clause 5 of the NYPE (whether on its own or in conjunction with the anti-technicality clause) is a 
condition was wrong, the Compensation Clause elevated the obligation to pay hire to the status of a 
condition.  
 
2.3.5. The analysis of the legal grounds on which The Astra is based 
2.3.5.1. The express right of withdrawal as an indication of parties’ intentions  
As already indicated above, one of the essential reasons for the conclusion that clause 5 of the NYPE is 
a condition given by Flaux J in The Astra was the fact that clause 5 of the NYPE provides a right to 
withdraw the vessel whenever there is a failure to make punctual payment of hire. According to the 
learned judge the contractual right to terminate the charterparty irrespective of the gravity of the breach 
of the obligation to pay hire “is a strong indication” of the parties’ intention that any failure to pay hire 
punctually goes to the root of the contract and thus that the provision is a condition. 
 
To support this conclusion Flaux J relied on Moore-Bick LJ reasoning in Stocznia v Gearbulk and 
dismissed the suggestion in Time Charters that the right to withdraw only adds to the obligation to pay 
hire a characteristic of a condition
94
 stating that the argument is “somewhat heretical” as an “obligation 
either is a condition or it is not”95. 
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 Ibid. at 95–96(§§110–114). 
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 Ibid. at 96(§§115–116). 
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 Time Charters §16.13 reads as follows “It may be that the judicial remarks recorded above should not be 
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As to the reasoning in Stocznia v Gearbulk Flaux J stated that  
“…there are obvious differences between the structure of that contract and the charterparty in the 
present case…and there are no terms of the charterparty which provide a remedy of liquidated 
damages. Nonetheless, it does seem to me that the reasoning of Moore-Bick LJ is of some assistance, 
particularly because it makes clear that where the right to terminate for a particular breach indicates 
that, on the true construction of the contract in question, the breach goes to the root of the contract, in 
other words the term is a condition or essential term, upon termination, the innocent party will be 
entitled to claim damages for loss of bargain”96 (emphasis added). 
 
It is submitted that what in fact Flaux J is stating is that if, upon true construction of the contract, the 
clause, upon breach of which the express termination right arises, is a condition, the innocent party is 
entitled to claim damages for loss of bargain. With respect, such a conclusion only mirrors what is 
indeed settled law. It is submitted that, according to the current state of English law, an express 
contractual right to terminate the contract co-exists alongside its common law rights (unless there is an 
express and clear agreement to the contrary)
97
. Besides that, it is not clear how Flaux J’s conclusion 
does support the later Flaux J’s finding that contractual right to terminate the charterparty irrespective 
of the gravity of the breach of the obligation to pay hire “is a strong indication” that the provision in 
question is a condition. It seems that Flaux J fails to read the Moore-Brick LJ speech in Stocznia v. 
Gearbulk in the light of the particular facts of the case where it was found that, contrasted with the 
provisions of liquidated damages, the express contractual right to terminate was construed as arising 
only in cases of repudiatory breaches. It is submitted that the above cited Flaux J’s sum up of Moore-
Brick’s LJ speech in Stocznia v. Gearbulk thus only takes us that far that the question whether clause 5 
of the NYPE is a condition is indeed a question of construction. 
 
It is also suggested that Flaux J was too dismissive of the argument in Time Charters, because “it is 
hard to see why it should be heretical to suggest that a contractual obligation, albeit classified by the 
common law (or indeed by the parties) as an intermediate term, can, if the parties so choose, be 
supported by a right to terminate on any breach, leaving only the right to claim damages for loss of 
bargain to be dependent on the seriousness of the breach”98. 
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 The Astra at 92(§99). 
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 This is clearly stated by Peel (at p.536) with references to cases including Stocznia v. Gearbulk and, in 
addition, also confirmed in a recent Newland Shipping case. 
98
 Shirley, §25. 
28 
 
While it is generally true, as indicated in the Chitty’s list in sub-section 2.2.1.2., that a contractual term 
“will be held to be a condition…if the consequences of its breach, that is, the right of the innocent 
party to treat himself as discharged, are provided for expressly in the contract”99, the law on this point 
is not that straightforward.  
 
It is submitted that there may be situations when parties to a contract expressly provide in the contract 
that one party shall be entitled to terminate in the event of a specified breach of the contract by the 
other, but do not intend the obligation upon breach of which the right to terminate arises to elevate to 
the status of a condition. Indeed, there is case law which is in line with the submission. 
 
In the Court of Appeal’s case Financings Ltd v. Baldock a hire-purchase agreement for a truck was 
terminated under an express provision allowing termination for non-payment of hire, since the hirer 
was two instalments in arrears. The hire-purchase agreement also contained an express right to 
repossess and a minimum payment clause, entitling the ship-owners to two-thirds of the total cost of 
hiring in the event of termination. Since the agreement did not make time of payment of the essence 
and there was no express agreement that hire payment clause was a condition, the Court of Appeal held 
that as the hirer’s default was not sufficient to constitute a repudiatory breach and the minimum 
payment clause was a penalty, the finance company was not entitled to damages for loss of bargain.  
 
In contrast, in the Court of Appeal’s case the Lombard which, as admitted by Nicholls LJ, had no 
practical difference from Financings Ltd v. Baldock case it was decided that the plaintiff finance 
company which terminated a contract for hire-purchase of a computer for failure of hire payment was 
entitled to damages for loss of bargain. The decision which the Court of Appeal reached with unease 
differed from the Financings Ltd v. Baldock case only on one point which “skilled draftsman can easily 
side-step”100, that is because a punctual hire payment was expressly made of the essence in the contract 
and thus a condition. Notably, the Court of Appeal did not consider Financings Ltd v. Baldock not to 
be good law and indeed noted that Financings Ltd v. Baldock was followed in a number of cases
101
.  
 
It is explained that the real basis for the decision in Financings Ltd v. Baldock is the legal ground of 
damages for loss of bargain. It is suggested that the legal basis of damages for loss of bargain is a 
repudiatory breach which has the forward-looking aspect that a non-repudiatory breach lacks and this 
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is most obvious when the repudiatory breach takes the form of renunciation, i.e. the defendant evinces 
an intention not to perform the contract, but substantial failure to perform and breach of a condition are 
treated in law in the same way
102
. Although these logics of damages for loss of bargain were attempted 
to criticize
103
, it is compelling that this is namely the current state of English law.  
 
Financings Ltd v. Baldock thus has its critics
104
 and supporters
105
 but for the purposes of this thesis it 
adequately illustrates that there may be contractual terms which are given a characteristic of a 
condition, namely a right to terminate upon any breach, but do not confer automatically upon the 
innocent party damages for loss of bargain and thus are not conditions in its classic sense
106
. 
 
As Peel puts it in Treitel on the Law of Contract the rationale of express termination clauses is to 
prevent disputes from arising as to often difficult question whether the failure in performance is 
sufficiently serious to justify termination and they take effect even though there is no substantial 
failure
107. This indeed corresponds with the Thomas’ view that uncertainty and limitations of legal 
remedies for charterers’ payment default contributed to emergence of contractual remedies, e.g. the 
right to withdraw upon failure of punctual hire payment
108
.  
 
On the other hand, an indirect support for the proposition that express termination right upon a breach 
of a contractual term does not inevitably means that a term breached is a condition rests in The Antaios 
case. The House of Lords in The Antaios held that the withdrawal clause (express termination right) 
may not be invoked upon any breach of the charterparty (unless a breach amounts to repudiation). It 
must be noticed, however, that in cases where a court has to deal with an express termination right 
granted upon any breach of a contract, courts incline into the analysis of commercial reasonableness 
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and business commonsense as indicators of the parties’ intentions and only when it is found that upon 
true construction of the contract the parties did intend that express termination right shall be invoked 
upon any breach, termination is held to be valid
109
. 
 
As has been demonstrated, the express contractual right of termination solely on its own cannot be 
validly regarded as a strong indicator that the contractual clause upon breach of which the express right 
of termination may be exercised is a condition.  
 
It is therefore submitted that an express termination right in clause 5 of the NYPE (i.e. withdrawal 
clause) solely on its own does not necessarily indicate that the parties did intend that every failure of 
punctual payment of hire would go to the root of the charterparty. It is parties’ intentions that matter, 
but they are not to be deduced solely from the express contractual right of termination. Whether the 
clause in a contract upon breach of which express contractual right to terminate is granted is a 
condition therefore is a question of construction, which has to be answered by use of construction 
techniques. The fact that there is an express contractual right to terminate may support the conclusion 
that the clause is a condition, but not vice versa.  
 
2.3.5.2. The obligation to pay hire punctually is of the essence of the charterparty 
Another essential reason for the conclusion that clause 5 of the NYPE is a condition given by Flaux J 
in The Astra was that the obligation to pay hire punctually is a provision where time is of the essence 
and thus a condition. 
 
In support of the proposition that the obligation to pay hire is a provision where time is of the essence, 
Flaux J largely relied on Bunge v. Tradax which he reads as giving a firm ground for the proposition 
that “the general rule in mercantile contracts, where there is a “time” provision requiring something to 
be done by a certain time or payment to be made by a certain time, is that time is considered of the 
essence”110. While it is generally true that stipulations as to time in commercial setting are treated 
differently from those in non-commercial contracts, it is respectfully submitted that there is no 
presumption of fact or rule of law that time is of the essence in mercantile contracts such that 
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stipulation as to time in such a contract may, on its true construction, be found not of the essence and 
thus an intermediate term
111
. 
 
In the light of post-Bunge v. Tradax cases
112
 it is suggested that the Bunge v. Tradax case, where the 
interdependence between of the buyers’ obligation to give 15 consecutive days loading notice and the 
sellers’ obligation to nominate a port was examined, should be read not as formulating a general rule, 
but as stating that a term as to time will be treated as a condition when a term is a condition precedent 
to the ability of the other party to perform its obligation pursuant to another term
113
. It is indicated
114
 
that such a limited reading of Bunge v. Tradax case may be found in a more recent Aktor
115
 case. 
 
As to the obligation to pay hire, there is no firm authority whether the obligation to pay hire is a 
condition precedent to the provision of services by the ship-owners to the charterers. Nevertheless, in 
The Agios Giorgis Mocatta J commented that there was force in the argument, based on The Brimnes 
and Leslie Shipping, that the obligation to pay hire under clause 5 of the NYPE is not a condition 
precedent to immediate further performance by the ship-owners
116
. Flaux J, however, dismissed the 
relevance of The Agios Giorgis because of the different factual situation and, implicitly, because of its 
reliance on The Brimnes
117
. Notably, Flaux J did not address the dicta in The Tankexpress by Lord 
Porter where he commented on the interdependence of the payment of hire and provision of the 
services of the ship and, albeit tended to, but did not conclude that there is no interdependence between 
the two
118
. However, since there is no firm authority that the obligation to pay hire is a condition 
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precedent to ship-owners’ ability to provide services agreed under a time charterparty, the hard and fast 
Bunge v. Tradax rule of stipulations as to time it is submitted is inapplicable.  
 
Given the limited reading of Bunge v. Tradax, it is suggested that time stipulations are little different 
from other stipulations in commercial contracts
119
. It follows from case law that in the absence of 
express agreement courts will construe time stipulations in commercial contracts as of the essence by 
making a value judgment about the commercial significance of the term in question in its factual and 
contractual setting
120
. Courts tend to find time stipulations to be of the essence in cases where non-/late 
performance may prejudice existing contractual strings
121
 or undermine commercial certainty
122
, but in 
any event the importance of a term in question will be judged in the light of the whole contractual 
context
123
. 
Notably, payment obligations in sale contracts are not treated to be of the essence, unless there are facts 
or circumstances which attach the fundamental importance to them, e.g. in case of perishable goods or 
if the buyer fails to pay deposit on time
124
. No similar parallel may be drawn from cases of deposits 
with the payments of hire as deposits establish buyer’s seriousness about completing the contract of 
sale
125
 and no such crucial importance may be attached to periodical payments of hire. 
It is submitted that there is no support in the authorities, apart from obiter statements, that the 
obligation to pay hire in time charterparties is an exception to the rule that performance on time is not 
of the essence. To support the contrary view Flaux J referred
126
 to the dicta of the House of Lords in 
The Tankexpress, The Laconia, The Mihalios Xilas, United Scientifics Holdings, and The Afovos. 
The first three cases are concerned with the interpretation of express withdrawal clause where courts 
have supported the literal application of the clause and elaborated on the obligation to pay hire as 
absolute obligation
127
, stating that if payment of hire is not made on time there is default in payment 
irrespective of any reason that the charterers may have and regardless if late payment is tendered 
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before withdrawal or not
128
. Namely in this respect the argumentation of commercial certainty was 
employed in these cases and not, with respect, as suggested by Flaux J
129
, to support that the obligation 
to pay hire is a condition. 
The fourth case, namely, United Scientific Holdings is a case concerned with rent review clauses in 
tenancy contracts (thus not a time charterparty case at all) and the only obiter statement in that case 
that “in a charterparty a stipulated time of payment of hire is of the essence”130 was made without 
reference to authorities and thus is of little help. 
The only case that “presents difficulty…that clause 5 is not a condition”131 is indeed The Afovos, the 
statements of Lord Diplock in which give an impression that clause 5 of the NYPE is construed as a 
condition. However, the „difficulty“ is not irresolvable. For this it is necessary to look at the case as a 
whole, not only to the extract of Lord Diplock’s speech, which, as is suggested, has muddied the 
waters
132
. 
The Afovos case concerned withdrawal under clause 5 of the NYPE, where ship-owners gave a 
premature notice of withdrawal and thus it was ineffective with the consequence that withdrawal was 
held to be unlawful. However, on the assumption that when the ship-owners gave their notice it was 
clear that charterers’ payment would not be received on time, the ship-owners argued that they could 
invoke the doctrine of anticipatory breach. Since no repudiatory breach was found (one single missed 
hire payment did not amount to a repudiatory breach), the doctrine of anticipatory breach was 
inapplicable
133
.  
It is suggested that ship-owners’ “argument was misconceived”, because clause 5 was not a condition 
and the charterparty simply conferred an express right to give a notice on the occurrence of a specified 
event which had not occurred
134
. In other words, had the clause 5 of the NYPE been considered to be a 
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condition in The Afovos, the ship-owners’ argument of anticipatory breach most probably would have 
succeeded (because the failure to pay hire on time would have been held by definition to be a 
repudiatory breach). Namely for this reason Lord Diplock’s speech is suggested to add some 
complication to the case
135
. 
In the light of the aforementioned, it is possible to see that Lord Diplock was treating clause 5 of the 
NYPE as Time Charters suggest having one characteristic of a condition when he said 
“The owners are to be at liberty to withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers; in other 
words they are entitled to treat the breach when it occurs as a breach of condition and so giving them 
the right to elect to treat it as putting an end to all their own primary obligations under the charterparty 
then remaining unperformed”136 (emphasis added). 
 
And most probably misapplying the term “condition” when he stated that  
“But although failure by the charterers in punctual payment of any installment, however brief the delay 
involved may be, is made a breach of condition it is not also thereby converted into a fundamental 
breach; and it is to fundamental breaches alone that the doctrine of anticipatory breach is applicable”137 
(emphasis added). 
 
Given the analysis above, it is doubtful whether the authorities support that clause 5 of the NYPE is to 
be considered of the essence of the charterparty and thus a condition. 
 
In contrast, in The Gregos, decided by the House of Lords, the redelivery clause as to time was not 
held to be a condition although given the commercial setting of chartering business the exact redelivery 
time may be and very often is very important, failure to comply with which may result in the ship-
owners losing subsequent time charterparties and thus being exposed to substantial loss. Thus, it is far 
from being straightforward that time stipulations in time charterparties are of the essence and therefore 
conditions.  
 
2.3.5.3. The Brimnes distinguished – the anti-technicality clause 
As indicated above, Flaux J held that time of payment in clause 5 of the NYPE was of the essence of 
the charterparty and supported this conclusion with reference to the dicta of the House of Lords, 
although Flaux J conceded that The Brimnes was of the contrary effect. To overcome the difficulty of 
The Brimnes, Flaux J stated that the anti-technicality clause in clause 31 distinguished The Brimnes 
from the present case. 
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Flaux J concluded that the anti-technicality clause made time of the essence if otherwise time was not 
of the essence. To support this conclusion Flaux J relied on Stocznia v. Latco, a shipbuilding case 
where Lord Rix held: 
“In a contract where a vessel is to be built with funds provided by the purchaser in stages, an 
installment notice is to be given requiring payment within 5 banking days, and a further 21 days of 
grace are then allowed, I do not see why provision for what is then called default entitling rescission 
should not be regarded as setting a condition of the contract”138 (emphasis added). 
It is submitted that Stocznia v. Latco does not suggest that the 21 days grace period made time of 
payment of the essence and thus a condition – it is most probably the contract itself  “where a vessel is 
to be built with funds provided by the purchaser in stages” suggests the significance of payment within 
the agreed period. Indeed, time charterparties and shipbuilding contracts are by their very nature 
different and periodical hire payments cannot be simply equated with keel-laying instalments, which 
are not necessarily condition precedent to the performance of the yard but are milestone payments in a 
way that hire payments are not
139
.  
 
Similarly, Flaux J‘s reference to The Mahakam case to support his reasoning that the existence of the 
anti-technicality clause makes the obligation to pay hire a condition is of little persuasive value. The 
Mahakam case differs from the situation in The Astra, first, because the case concerned bareboat 
charterers’ obligation to pay hire and, second, bareboat charterers’ obligation to pay hire on time was 
expressly made of the essence in the contract. Notably, in The Mahakam parties’ intentions to consider 
charterer’s payment obligation as a condition were deduced from express stipulation that time is of the 
essence and the general commercial setting and the scheme of the bareboat charterparty was not 
addressed in the judgment
140
. 
 
2.3.5.4. The Brimnes wrongly decided 
However, Flaux J went even further and stated that he would, even in the absence of the anti-
technicality clause, albeit with some hesitation, decline to follow The Brimnes
141
. Flaux J gave three 
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reasons. First, The Brimnes, according to Flaux J, cannot be reconciled with the dicta of the House of 
Lords in The Tankexpress, The Laconia, Mihalios Xilas, United Scientific Holdings, Bunge v Tradax, 
and The Afovos. Second, The Brimnes was based on The Georgios C which was subsequently 
overruled by the House of Lords in The Laconia. Third, Brandon J’s conclusion in The Brimnes 
involved acceptance of the argument that the word “punctual” added little or nothing to the word 
“payment” standing alone, an argument the validity of which depended on the correctness of The 
Georgios C.   
 
While it is suggested that there is uncertainty on authorities and The Brimnes might not represent the 
current state of English law
142
, there are points to be made in favour of The Brimnes. 
 
First, as demonstrated above it is not that straightforward that the dicta of the House of Lords points to 
the obligation to pay hire punctually being of the essence and thus a condition.  
 
Second, it is debatable whether Brandon J’s judgment was indeed made by extensive reliance on The 
Georgios C. Although The Georgios C was cited quite extensively in The Brimnes, it must not be 
overlooked that The Georgios C at the time The Brimnes was decided represented the law and thus 
could not be ignored. But most importantly it is the fact that The Georgios C was distinguished in The 
Brimnes and namely on the point which subsequently was overruled by the House of Lords in The 
Laconia. It is suggested that Brandon J was not satisfied with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in 
The Georgios C and being unable to overrule it distinguished it
143
. In any event it is difficult not to 
notice the acceptance of The Brimnes expressed by the House of Lords in The Laconia
144
, even though 
not directly on the condition point.  
 
And finally, it is difficult to follow Flaux J’s argument that Brandon J in The Brimnes accepted that 
word “punctual” added little or nothing to the word “payment” and for this reason The Brimnes should 
not be followed. It indeed seems implicit that Brandon J did not consider word “punctual” being 
capable of making the obligation an essential term of the contract when he decided that the obligation 
to pay hire in clause 5 of the NYPE was not a condition
145
. However, is there any authority indicating 
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that word “punctual” in a contract does have the same effect as words “of the essence”146? It is 
submitted that if the word “punctual” would equate to the words “time of the essence” the decision in 
The Astra as well as other cases prior to The Astra concerning the construction of withdrawal clauses 
would have had much less complication. It seems that Flaux J does not pay enough attention to the fact 
that Brandon J in The Brimnes, opting for different construction of withdrawal clause than that in The 
Georgios C, did indeed attribute importance to the word “punctual” (and its meaning that once hire is 
not paid before or on the due date the payment of hire is not punctual and therefore the right of 
withdrawal is not lost by mere tender of payment after the due date). Namely on this aspect The 
Brimnes was expressly accepted by the House of Lords in The Laconia and later applied in The 
Chikuma. 
 
2.3.5.5. The need for certainty upon failure to make punctual payment of hire 
The third essential reason for the conclusion that clause 5 of the NYPE is a condition given by Flaux J 
in The Astra was the importance to businessmen of certainty in commercial transactions.  
The situation, where the ship-owners, faced with non-payment of hire in a falling market would be left 
with no remedy in damages at all (except the cases where the charterers would be in repudiatory 
breach) and in order to claim damages they would need to “wait and see” until they were in a position 
to say that the charterers were in repudiatory breach, according to Flaux J, “is inimical to certainty”147. 
As indicated earlier in the thesis it is true that classification of contractual terms as conditions does 
indeed promote certainty, but certainty is not per se a basis for classification of contractual terms as 
conditions
148
. Thus it is the parties’ intentions drawn from the particular context and contractual setting 
which determines which of the rival values, i.e. whether certainty or flexibility, are to be favoured. 
There is no hard and fast rule which would stipulate that certainty is to be preferred for flexibility – if it 
was, there probably was no need for intermediate terms. However, it is true that it is in a commercial 
setting where certainty is most often given priority. As in the case of time stipulations
149
, the choice 
between certainty and flexibility is to the large extent determined by the results of the value judgment 
about the commercial significance of the term in question in its factual and contractual setting. It is 
submitted therefore that it is a question of construction the answer to which depends how significant 
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the punctual payment of hire is to be held in time charterparty context and it is indeed debatable 
whether the obligation to pay hire construed as a condition for the sake of certainty does not undermine 
the values with which the emergence of intermediate terms is associated.  
 
2.3.5.6. The obiter judicial support  
As indicated above, the fourth essential reason for the conclusion that clause 5 of the NYPE is a 
condition given by Flaux J in The Astra was that the obiter statements in Stocznia v. Latco and 
Stocznia v Gearbulk supported this conclusion. These cases were commented upon in sections above
150
 
and are thus not repeated here. 
 
2.3.6. Concluding remarks. Could The Astra have been decided differently?  
Given the objective of this part of the thesis indicated in the Introduction and in the view of the 
discussion above, it is submitted that there is considerable room for questioning the legal grounds on 
which The Astra is based.  
 
Although Flaux J indicated four essential reasons on which he based his conclusion in The Astra that 
the obligation to pay hire is a condition, it is submitted that The Astra is mainly based on the following: 
 
First, Flaux J relied on his interpretation of Bunge v. Tradax stating that according to the Bunge v. 
Tradax time stipulations in mercantile contracts are of the essence and thus conditions – as 
demonstrated in the thesis
151
 Bunge v. Tradax should probably be read in a more limited manner; 
 
Second, Flaux J indicated that dicta of the House of Lords in The Tankexpress, The Laconia, The 
Mihalios Xilas, United Scientific Holdings and The Afovos supported the idea that the obligation to pay 
hire is a provision where time is of the essence – as discussed in the thesis152 these cases are of little 
persuasive value since they either are non-time charterparty cases or because the reasoning of the court 
in these cases did not concern the issue whether obligation to pay hire is a condition but the 
construction of withdrawal clauses; 
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Third, Flaux J relied considerably on non-time charter party cases, i.e. shipbuilding (Stocznia v. Latco, 
Stocznia v Gearbulk) and bareboat charterparty (Mahakam) cases, - and given the fundamental 
differences between such contracts and a time charterparty (as set out above) it is difficult to accept 
them as persuasive arguments
153
; 
 
Last but not least, Flaux J could not have reached his conclusion that the obligation to pay hire in 
clause 5 of the NYPE is a condition without declining to follow The Brimnes – however, the reasoning 
not to follow The Brimnes is also open to debate
154
. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, it must be admitted that since there is no firm judicial authority on the 
matter the issue of characterization of the obligation to pay hire as a contractual term is controversial 
and probably will be until there is some further judicial development. Taking into account the above-
mentioned Chitty’s list of cases when a contractual term generally will be held to be a condition, it is 
submitted that the potential support for the proposition that the obligation to pay hire in clause 5 of the 
NYPE is an intermediate term lies in the analysis of parties’ intentions, inferred from the nature of the 
contract and/or subject-matter and/or circumstances of the case
155
.  
 
Since standard time charterparties are not genuinely negotiated contracts by the parties and the content 
of these contracts has evolved through years, the source where the parties’ intentions could be inferred 
from is most probably the commercial setting wherein the obligation to pay hire is found to be. 
 
As analyzed in the thesis
156, according to Lord Kerr’s approach in The Golodetz which was 
subsequently accepted by the House of Lords, the analysis of the commercial significance of the 
contractual term in question is two-fold: first, it is necessary to look whether the contractual term is a 
condition precedent to the performance of other term(s) by the other party; second, if the contractual 
term is not a condition precedent, the significance of a particular contractual term in a given 
commercial setting must be evaluated. 
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The first element, i.e. the interdependence of charterers’ obligation to pay hire and ship-owners’ 
obligation to provide services (whether the former is a condition precedent to the latter or not), is an 
important one, even though, admittedly, not decisive
157
. As indicated above
158
, the dicta in The Agios 
Giorgis and The Tankexpress, albeit obiter, support the view that the obligation to pay hire is not a 
condition precedent to the immediate performance of the ship-owners. In the absence of a firm judicial 
authority on this point, however, it may be said that from commercial perspective the interdependence 
of charterers’ obligation to pay hire and ship-owners’ obligation to perform services cannot be equated 
to the interdependence of the buyers’ obligation to give 15 consecutive days loading notice and the 
sellers’ obligation to nominate port as it was held in Bunge v. Tradax. General business logics suggests 
that one non-/late payment of hire without more in the context of commercial setting of time 
charterparty, where hire is paid periodically at certain time intervals, may not undermine ship-owners’ 
position so that charterers’ default could be considered as going to the root of the contract, if to use the 
Lord Kerr’s words in The Golodetz case159. It is therefore submitted that there is considerable force in 
the argument that charterers’ obligation to pay hire is not a condition precedent to the ship-owners 
obligation to perform services and thus, in the absence of policy considerations to the contrary, not a 
condition. 
 
If to follow Lord Kerr’s approach in The Golodetz and if to ignore the possible arguments favouring 
the obligation to pay hire is a condition precedent to ship-owners’ obligation to perform, it is namely 
the value judgment about the commercial significance of the obligation which has to be made. 
 
Although a value judgment is a synonym of a subjective approach to a question, in certain situations, 
e.g. as in The Golodetz or The Astra, such exercise may be said to be unavoidable. As it was analyzed 
in the thesis
160
, the commercial risk associated with trading of the vessel lies with the charterers, 
whereas the ship-owners by fixing the vessel with a time charterparty enjoy the benefits of regular and 
defined cash flow. From the ship-owners perspective, it is indeed charterers’ capability to make 
punctual hire payments that is at stake. Since there are no subsequent contracts that may fall upon 
charterers’ failure to pay hire punctually as it is in cases of sale-chains or “string” contracts161, it is 
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difficult to state with certainty that any breach of charterers’ obligation to pay hire goes to the root of 
the charterparty. In addition, from commercial perspective the construction of the obligation to pay hire 
as an intermediate term finds support in court’s reasoning in The Gregos, where a redelivery clause in 
time charterparty was held to be not a condition, although admittedly the breach of such clause exposes 
the ship-owners probably to greater risk (as subsequent charterparty may be at stake) than the breach of 
the obligation to pay hire does. At this point Lord Roskill’s words in The Hansa Nord may be 
instructive when he said “…where there is a free choice between two possible constructions…the 
Court should tend to prefer that construction which will ensure performance”162. 
 
To sum up, it is submitted that the question whether the obligation to pay hire is a condition or not is 
indeed controversial and arguments supporting both constructions may be found. As demonstrated by 
the above-discussion in the thesis the judicial dicta are mostly obiter and in most cases, where obiter 
pronouncements concerning the construction question are made, it is collateral issues to the 
construction question that are dealt with and not the straightforward question whether the obligation to 
pay hire is a condition. However, it is submitted that if in The Astra more attention had been paid to the 
question of commercial significance of the obligation to pay hire as well as to the analysis of the 
commercial setting and the interdependence of both charterers’ obligation to pay hire and ship-owners’ 
obligation to perform services, the conclusion in the Astra could have been different or, at least, the 
reasoning of the same conclusion would have been of greater persuasive value. 
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3. LEGAL EFFECTS AND COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
ASTRA AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY 
HIRE AS A CONDITION 
 
3.1. Introductory remarks 
It is worth noting that it is not crystal clear whether Flaux J’s judgment on the condition point is obiter 
(and thus persuasive) or is it a judgment decided on a number of grounds (and thus binding). Flaux J’s 
comment that the question whether or not the obligation to pay hire in clause 5 of the NYPE was a 
condition could be said to be academic
163
 contributes to the uncertainty.  
 
Nevertheless, The Astra is indeed “the most definitive judicial pronouncement on this issue [of the 
construction of the obligation to pay hire] to date”164. This part of the thesis thus aims to analyze legal 
and commercial effects of The Astra. 
 
3.2. Legal effects of The Astra. Post-Astra case law 
The practitioners agree that The Astra is unlikely to provide the final word on the issue and that until 
the higher court pronounces its position or at least until there is a binding decision directly on point the 
obligation to pay hire cannot be considered with certainty as a condition and Flaux J’s findings in The 
Astra will possibly be of persuasive value only
165
. Interestingly, an absolutely fresh 7
th
 edition of Time 
Charters (2014) shares the same opinion
166
. 
 
Even if not binding, The Astra nevertheless brings along certain legal implications. 
 
First, the charterers are exposed to greater risk when making deductions from hire. If prior to The Astra 
short payment of hire would not be immediately considered to be repudiatory, post-Astra short 
payment is considerably more risky because the smallest of underpayments potentially entitle a ship-
owner to terminate and claim what could be substantial damages for loss of bargain. 
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Second, it is submitted that The Astra makes ship-owners’ and charterers’ legal position probably more 
uncertain than prior to The Astra. This is so because it is not clear if The Astra will be followed as 
Flaux J’s pronouncement on condition point is more likely to be obiter and not to carry the weight of a 
precedent. Thus, the question then arises – would the ship-owners be successful if they terminate the 
charterparty upon one missed charterers’ payment of hire or even one short payment of hire (which 
would not amount to a repudiatory breach
167
) in the hope of receiving substantial loss of bargain 
damages? If it turns out that The Astra is not followed and the obligation to pay hire in question is not a 
condition the ship-owners, having terminated the charterparty as if for breach of a condition, may find 
themselves in a position of having lost a good charterparty and being only entitled to claim unpaid hire 
up to the date of termination
168
. From charterers’ perspective The Astra does contribute to the 
uncertainty of charterers’ legal position, which in any event means that the charterers need to be more 
careful in order to avoid any inadvertence in payments of hire and especially cautious in their finance 
management in order to have cash flow as smooth as possible.  
 
It is submitted that taking into account the two above-mentioned points both the ship-owners and the 
charterers are likely to reconsider the wording of the standard time charterparty forms. However, the 
real legal effects of The Astra are probably to be seen after a longer course of time as the post-Astra 
case law have not addressed the condition point yet. 
 
In a recent London arbitration case 7/14 (LMLN 20 March 2014) the charterers who failed to pay three 
hire payments were found to be in repudiatory breach on the grounds that the charterers had evinced 
that they would not or could not perform the contract (which was concluded on the NYPE), even 
though the charterers had attempted to draft their messages to the ship-owners so as to evince an 
intention to perform the charterparty in future
169
. The arbitration tribunal did not find difficulty to 
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conclude that the charterers were in repudiatory breach because the charterers failed to pay three 
installments of hire and in addition to that they failed to respond properly to unequivocal ship-owners’ 
questions concerning charterers’ future intentions to pay hire170. The case did not address the question 
of the construction of the obligation to pay hire and it seems the argument of possible waiver by the 
ship-owners was not raised. 
 
In another recent case of Januzaj v Valilas, although a non-shipping case, decided by the Court of 
Appeal, the issue of what amounts to a repudiatory breach in the context of an innominate term to 
make regular payments was considered and, if to put the judgment in the shipping context, it would 
follow that the ship-owners should be wary of attempting to terminate for non-payments if the ship-
owners know or ought to know that the charterers will eventually be able to pay everything that is due, 
because the court will treat those non-payments as being late rather than not paid at all, with the 
consequences more likely sounding in damages only, unless the delay is extreme
171
. It is submitted 
that, although Januzaj v Valilas is probably distinguishable from the cases where the charterers are in 
default in payment of hire, the case provides some assistance in reasoning that payment obligations in a 
commercial context are construed as intermediate terms and not necessarily “of the essence”. 
 
In the light of the discussion above, the legal effects of The Astra remains to be seen. 
 
3.3. Commercial implications of The Astra  
From commercial perspective, The Astra favouring the construction of the obligation to pay hire as a 
condition, which according to the current state of English law implies that the ship-owners are entitled 
to terminate the charterparty at common law and claim damages for loss of bargain upon any, even 
trivial charterers’ breach, signifies a shift of balance to the ship-owners side.  
 
The ship-owners faced with the charterers failing to make punctual hire payments in a falling market 
are at a relatively stronger position when demanding that payments were made on time as well as when 
they are invited by the charterers to re-negotiate the original charterparty terms (notwithstanding the 
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legal uncertainties
172
); whereas the charterers are exposed to greater commercial risks, since 
unsuccessful trading of the chartered vessel in a falling market is also associated with probable ship-
owners’ claim of damages for loss of bargain.  
 
However, the claims of damages for loss of bargain for the ship-owners is of interest only in a falling 
market and for this reason further developments in case law are not be expected to come up soon. 
 
3.4. Concluding remarks. Any prospects for development in the law of 
damages for loss of bargain?  
Given the objective of this part of the thesis indicated in the Introduction and in the view of the 
discussion above, it is submitted that the legal effects of The Astra remains to be seen. It is indeed 
interesting how the market players, first and foremost the ship-owners and their legal advisers, in the 
post-Astra light will act and arrange their legal position in situations of charterers’ default in payment 
of hire. And it is also interesting how the courts will develop the law of damages for loss of bargain. 
 
It is a rule under English law that the breach of a contract discharging the innocent party from further 
performance entitles the innocent party to terminate the contract at common law and to claim damages 
for loss of bargain, i.e. the source of the innocent party’s power to terminate at common law and to 
claim damages for loss of bargain is the same – repudiatory breach. Notably, apart from the 
repudiatory breach in a form of the evinced inability (incapacity) to perform or intention not to perform 
or to perform inconsistently with the contract, a contract may be repudiated due to breach of a 
condition or upon serious breach of an intermediate term which deprives the innocent party from 
substantially the whole benefit of a contract. Given the difficulties of construction of certain 
contractual terms and the significance of classification of contractual terms into particular categories, 
first and foremost, because of the immediate availability of damages for loss of bargain if the 
contractual term is held to be a condition, legal literature presents ideas for development in the context 
of cases when the construction of a contractual term as a condition brings along unsatisfactory result as 
happened in Lombard case, namely, the award of damages for loss of bargain.  
 
Peel in Treitel on the Law of Contract in his discussion about the legal effects of Financings v. Baldock 
and Lombard cases suggests that damages for loss of bargain should be available only when “there has 
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been substantial failure to perform, or the term broken amounted to a condition other than a 
consequence of the parties’ express classification”173. It follows that Peel is indeed suggesting a 
separate category of contractual terms – conditions as a consequence of parties’ express classification – 
a breach of which would not entitle the innocent party to claim damages for loss of bargain, whereas 
the usual “conditions” would. 
 
Similarly, Christopher Langley and Rebecca Loveridge suggests that there are grounds to divide the 
powers of the innocent to terminate at common law and to claim damages for loss of bargain, the latter, 
as suggested by the authors, should depend on the magnitude of the breach, if the contractual term 
breached is a “condition” as agreed by the parties174. 
 
The above-mentioned ideas propose development in the law of damages for loss of bargain, namely, 
when they are claimed upon breach of a condition which is classified as such as a consequence of 
parties’ agreement. In the light of The Astra it would mean that in order for the shipowners to get 
damages for loss of bargain, the gravity of charterers’ default should be taken into consideration. 
Although the proposition supposes considerable change in the law of damages for loss of bargain under 
English law, the possibility and probability of the development may not be fully excluded. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of The Astra in this thesis has attempted to demonstrate that there is considerable room 
for questioning the legal grounds on which Flaux J based his conclusion that the obligation to pay hire 
in clause 5 of the NYPE is a condition. It has also been attempted to show that if the learned judge had 
paid more attention in The Astra to the question of commercial significance of the obligation to pay 
hire as well as to the analysis of the commercial setting and the interdependence of both charterers’ 
obligation to pay hire and ship-owners’ obligation to perform services, the conclusion in the Astra 
which the judge reached could have been that the obligation to pay hire in clause 5 of the NYPE is an 
intermediate term or, at least, the reasoning of the same conclusion that the obligation is a condition 
would have been of greater persuasive value. 
 
The attempted insight into legal effects and commercial implications of The Astra has shown that the 
question whether The Astra will produce measurable effects or will it remain as indeed one of the most 
debatable decisions in recent years is still open and probably will be as such until the shipping market 
faces significant downs in freight rates as it occurred in 2008, since The Astra presents significant 
changes of shipowners’ legal and commercial position namely in a falling market. 
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